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Abstract
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with the
banking systems of the countries where they occur: (i) sovereign defaults and banking crises
tend to happen together, (ii) commercial banks have substantial holdings of government debt,
and (iii) sovereign defaults result in major contractions in bank credit and production. This
paper provides a rationale for these phenomena by extending the traditional sovereign default
framework to incorporate bankers who lend to both the government and the corporate sector.
When these bankers are highly exposed to government debt, a default triggers a banking cri-
sis, which leads to a corporate credit collapse and subsequently to an output decline. When
calibrated to the 2001-02 Argentine default episode, the model is able to produce default in
equilibrium at observed frequencies, and when defaults occur credit contracts sharply, gener-
ating output drops of 7 percentage points, on average. Moreover, the model matches several
moments of the data on macroeconomic aggregates, sovereign borrowing, and fiscal policy. The
framework presented can also be useful for studying the optimality of fractional defaults.
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1. Introduction1
Sovereign defaults and banking crises have been recurrent events in emerging economies.2
Recent default episodes in emerging economies (e.g., Russia 1998, Argentina 2001-02) have3
shown that whenever the sovereign decides to default on its debt there is an adverse impact on4
the domestic economy, largely through disruptions of the domestic financial systems. Why does5
this happen? Both in the Argentine and Russian cases (and also in others discussed below),6
the banking sectors were highly exposed to government debt. In this way a government default7
directly decreased the value of the banking sector’s assets. This forced banks to reduce credit to8
the domestic economy (a credit crunch), which in turn generated a decline in economic activity.9
The recent debt crisis in Europe also highlights the relationship between defaults, banking10
crises, and economic activity. In early 2012, most of the concerns around Greece’s possible11
default (or unfavorable restructuring) were related to the level of exposure that banks in Greece12
and other European countries had to Greek debt. The concerns were not only about losing what13
had been invested in Greek bonds, but also, and mostly, over how this shock to banks’ assets14
would impact their lending ability and ultimately the economic activity as a whole.115
This leads to the realization that sovereign default episodes can no longer be understood16
as events in which the defaulter su↵ers mainly from international financial exclusion and trade17
punishments. The motivation above, the empirical evidence reviewed later on, and the policy18
discussions (e.g., IMF, 2002, Lane, 2012) all suggest shifting the attention to domestic financial19
sectors and how they channel the adverse e↵ects of a default through the rest of the economy.20
The main contribution of this paper is in the quantification of the impact that a sovereign21
default has on the domestic banks balance sheets, their lending ability and economy-wide22
activity. To do so, we build on the work of Brutti (2011), Sandleris (2016), and Gennaioli et al.23
(2014) to apply a theory of the transmission mechanism of sovereign defaults to a quantitative24
setup. We endogenize the output cost of defaults in the following way: a sovereign default25
1Another related and current policy debate concerns the necessary improvements to regulatory policy for
European banks and the ways in which they value their holdings of sovereign debt. Di↵erent proposals have
been put forward aimed at lowering the fragility of the banking sector and its exposure to sovereign risk, like
the implementation of Eurobonds (see. Favero and Missale, 2012), or the creation of European Safe Bonds (see
Brunnermeier et al., 2011), among others. These proposals highlight how important it is for policy-making to
have a better understanding of the dynamic relation between sovereign borrowing, bank fragility, and economic
activity, and to have reliable quantifications of the impact of di↵erent government policies. Our paper provides
builds on theory of the dynamics to provide a quantification of the impact.
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triggers a credit crunch, and this credit crunch generates output declines. Ours is the first26
quantitative paper to endogenize the output cost of default as a function of the repudiated27
debt. This makes our framework a natural starting point to study the optimality of fractional28
defaults.29
Based on three key empirical regularities, namely that (i) defaults and banking crises tend30
to happen together, (ii) banks are highly exposed to government debt, and (iii) crisis episodes31
are costly in terms of credit and output, we build a theoretical framework that links defaults,32
banking sector performance, and economic activity. This paper rationalizes these phenomena33
extending a traditional sovereign default framework (in the spirit of Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981)34
to include bankers who lend to both the government and the corporate sector. When these35
bankers are highly exposed to government debt, a default triggers a banking crisis which leads36
to a corporate credit collapse and consequently to an output decline.37
These dynamics that characterize a default and a banking crisis are obtained as the optimal38
response of a benevolent planner: faced with a level of spending that needs to be financed,39
and having only two instruments at hand (debt and taxes), the planner may find it optimal40
to default on its debt even at the expense of decreased output and consumption. The planner41
balances the costs and benefits of a default: the benefit is the lower taxation needed to finance42
spending, and the cost is the reduced credit availability and the subsequently decreased output.43
Quantitative analysis of a version of the model calibrated to the 2001-02 Argentine default44
yields the following main findings: (1) default on equilibrium, (2) v-shaped behavior of output45
and credit around crisis episodes, (3) mean output decline in default episodes of approximately46
7 percentage points, and (4) the overall quantitative performance of the model is in line with47
the business cycle regularities observed in Argentina and other emerging economies.48
Layout. The remainder of this section reviews the related literature and the empirical evidence49
motivating the paper. Section 2 introduces the economic problem of banks with holdings of50
defaultable government debt. Section 3 describes the rest of the model economy and defines the51
equilibrium. Section 4 presents details of the calibration and the numerical solution. Section52
5 has the main results, and Section 6 presents robustness exercises. Section 7 concludes. All53
tables and graphs are at the end of the manuscript.54
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1.1. Related literature55
This paper belongs to the quantitative literature on sovereign debt and default, following the56
contributions of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008). In particular, a related work57
is by Mendoza and Yue (2012) who are the first to endogenize the cost of default: a sovereign58
default forces the private sector to use less e cient resources. We propose an alternative and59
complementary source for output costs: a disruption in domestic lending triggered by non-60
performing sovereign bonds in domestic banks’ balance sheets.61
In recent years there has been a surge in studies looking at the feedback loop between62
sovereign risk and bank risk. Acharya et al. (2014) model a stylized economy where bank63
bailouts (financed via a combination of increased taxation and increased debt issuance) can solve64
an underinvestment problem in the financial sector, but exacerbate another underinvestment65
problem in the non-financial sector. Higher debt needed to finance bailouts dilutes the value of66
previously issued debt, increases sovereign risk and creates a feedback loop between bank risk67
and sovereign risk because banks hold government debt in their portfolios. On the policy side,68
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) argue for the creation of European Safe Bonds as a way to break69
this feedback loop. The idea relies on pooling (buying debt from all the European countries)70
and tranching (securitization of those bonds into two tranches: a small and safe senior tranche,71
and a larger and riskier junior tranche). Regulatory reform will in turn induce banks to hold72
the senior tranche breaking the link between sovereign risk and bank risk.73
Other researchers have recently (and independently) noticed the link between sovereign risk74
and bank fragility, and have studied how it a↵ects borrowing policies and default incentives.75
Gennaioli et al. (2014) construct a stylized model of domestic and external sovereign debt in76
which domestic debt weakens the balance sheets of banks. This potential damage to the bank-77
ing sector represents in itself a signaling device that attracts more and cheaper foreign lending.78
Balloch (2016) studies an economy where domestic banks demand government debt for its79
colateralizability properties (above and beyond its financial return). Domestic bank holdings80
serve as an imperfect commitment device, and help the sovereign to raise funds from abroad81
at lower rates.2 Our analysis relates to these papers in that it also identifies the damage that82
2Another related study is Brutti (2011) who presents a sovereign debt model in which public debt is a source
of liquidity and a default generates a liquidity crisis.
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financial institutions su↵er during defaults. We identify the reduced credit as the endogenous83
mechanism generating output costs of defaults and also analyze the benefit side: how distor-84
tionary taxation can be reduced when defaults occur. Additionally, our dynamic stochastic85
general equilibrium model allows us to quantify the importance of the “balance-sheet channel”86
while also being able to account for various empirical regularities in emerging economies. 387
Recent work has also study the e↵ects of banks’ exposure and default risk on the domestic88
economy. Broner et al. (2014) provide a model with creditor discrimination and financial fric-89
tions, where an increase in sovereign risk incentivizes domestic holdings of sovereign debt (due90
to discrimination in favor of domestic creditors), crowds-out private investment and generates91
an output decline. Bocola (2016) studies the macroeconomic implications of increased sovereign92
risk in a model where banks are exposed to government debt. His framework takes default risk93
as given and shows how the anticipation of a default can be recessionary on its own. Perez94
(2015) who also studies the output costs of default when domestic banks hold government debt.95
Public debt serves two roles in his framework: it facilitates international borrowing, and it pro-96
vides liquidity to domestic banks. We relate to these studies in analyzing the balance-sheet97
e↵ects of a sovereign default in a quantitative model where default decisions are endogenous.98
Finally, this paper also relates to recent research on optimal fiscal policy in the presence99
of sovereign risk. Pouzo and Presno (2016) study the optimal taxation problem of a planner100
in a closed economy with defaultable debt. Our main di↵erences with Pouzo and Presno101
(2016) are two: firstly, they rely on an exogenous cost of default, whereas we propose an102
endogenous structure; and secondly, they assume commitment to a certain tax schedule but103
not to a repayment policy, whereas we assume no commitment on the part of the government.104
Kirchner and van Wijnbergen (2016) study the e↵ectiveness of debt-financed fiscal stimulus105
when government debt is held by leveraged-constrained domestic banks. Higher government106
deficits tighten banks’ leverage constraint and create a crowding-out e↵ect on private investment107
(which may o↵set the initial stimulus). We also analyze the dynamic relationship between108
government policy and bank holdings of sovereign debt, but our focus is on the default incentives109
and output costs rather than on the stabilizing e↵ects of government stimuli.110
3Our analysis is also consistent with Sandleris (2016), who finds that the main costs of default come through
the e↵ects on the agents’ balance sheets and expectations.
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1.2. Empirical evidence111
In this sub-section we review the three main empirical regularities that motivate this study.112
Defaults and banking crises tend to happen together. A recent empirical study on banking crises113
and sovereign defaults is the one by Balteanu et al. (2011). Using the dates of sovereign debt114
crises provided by Standard & Poor’s and the systemic banking crises identified in Laeven and115
Valencia (2008), they build a sample with 121 sovereign defaults and 131 banking crises for 117116
emerging and developing countries from 1975 to 2007. Among these, they identify 36 “twin117
crises” (defaults and banking crises): in 19 of them a sovereign default preceded the banking118
crisis and in 17 the reverse was true. 4119
Banks are highly exposed to sovereign debt. Kumhof and Tanner (2005) define the “exposure120
ratio” of a given country as the financial institutions’ net credit to the government divided by121
the financial institutions’ net total assets. Using IMF data for the period 1998-2002 they report122
an average exposure ratio of 22% for all countries, 24% for developing economies, and 16% for123
advanced economies. Interestingly, for countries that actually defaulted this ratio was even124
higher (e.g., Argentina: 33%, Russia: 39%). A more recent empirical study by Gennaioli et al.125
(2016) reports an average exposure ratio of 9.3% when using granular data from Bankscope126
(which includes banks from both advanced and developing countries). When they focus only127
on defaulting countries, they find an exposure ratio of roughly 15%. 5128
Crisis episodes are characterized by decreased output and credit. It has been documented that129
output falls sharply in the event of a sovereign default. The estimates vary across the empirical130
literature, but all show that the output costs of defaults are sizable (e.g., Reinhart and Rogo↵,131
2009 report an 8% cumulative output decline in the three-year run-up to a domestic and external132
default crisis). 6 Additionally, output exhibits a v-shaped behavior around defaults.133
These crises are also characterized by decreased credit to the private sector. Data from the134
Financial Structure Dataset (Beck et al., 2010) indicate that private credit (as a percentage of135
GDP) falls on average 8% in the default year and remains low for the subsequent periods.136
4Previous empirical studies have found similar results, e.g. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and Reinhart
and Rogo↵ (2009), among many others.
5Broner et al. (2014) also document the increase in exposure experienced in European countries since 2007.
6Sturzenegger (2004) finds that a defaulting country that also su↵ers a banking crisis would typically expe-
rience output 4.5% below trend five years after the event.
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2. Modeling bankers137
The quantitative impact of sovereign defaults and banking crises depends on the specifics138
of the transmission mechanism. This mechanism, in turn, depends on the modeling of the139
financial sector, and so we devote this section to the bankers’ problem describing the market140
for loanable funds and discussing the main assumptions. The rest of the model economy, which141
is standard in the quantitative literature of sovereign debt, is presented in the next section.142
2.1. Preliminaries143
Bankers are assumed to be risk-neutral agents. In each period, they participate in two144
di↵erent credit markets: the loan market (between private non-financial firms and bankers)145
and the sovereign bond market (between the domestic government and bankers). The working146
assumption is that they participate in these markets sequentially. 7147
The bankers lend to both firms and government from a pool of funds available to them148
during each period. These bankers start the period with the following resources: A, s(k) and149
b. A represents an exogenous endowment, which the bankers receive each period. 8 s(k) is150
the return on a storage technology: the previous period the banker put k into this technology,151
and today the return is s(k). b represents the level of sovereign debt owned by the bankers at152
the beginning of the period (which was optimally chosen in the previous period). Hereinafter153
d 2 {0, 1} will stand for the default policy, with d = 1 (0) meaning default (repayment).154
Sequence of events for the bankers. Firstly, the banker receives the endowment, A, has access to155
the stored funds from the previous period, s(k), and gets government debt repayment, b(1 d).156
Secondly, with those funds in hand, the banker extends intraperiod loans to firms, ls. Finally,157
at the end of the period, the banker collects the proceeds from the loans, ls(1 + r), and then158
solves a portfolio problem: chooses how much to lend to the government, (1   d)qb0, and how159
much to store, k0, with the remainder being left for consumption, x.160
7The assumption of sequential banking is no di↵erent from the day-market/night-market assumption com-
monly used in the money-search literature (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005).
8 There are a number of ways to interpret this endowment, A. See subsection 2.4 for a detailed discussion.
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2.2. Bankers problem161
From the above timing we have that lending to the firms is limited by the funds obtained at162
the beginning of the period: F ⌘ A+ s(k)+ b(1  d). This is captured in the following lending163
constraint: ls  F . The problem of the bankers can be written in recursive form as:164
W (b, k, z) = max
{x,ls,b0,k0}
⇢
x+   EW (b0, k0, z0)
 
(1)
s.t. x = F + lsr   k0   (1  d)qb0 (2)
ls  F (3)
F ⌘ A+ s(k) + b(1  d) (4)
where W (·) is the banker’s value function, E is the expectation operator, b0 represents165
government bonds demand, q is the price per sovereign bond, r is the interest rate on the166
private loans, x is the end-of-period consumption of the banker (akin to dividends),   stands167
for the discount factor, and z is the aggregate productivity. We can rewrite (1) - (4) as follows:168
W (b, k; z) = max
{ls,b0,k0,µ}
⇢
A+ s(k) + b(1  d) + lsr   k0   (1  d)qb0
+  EW (b0, k0; z0) + µ[A+ s(k) + b(1  d)  ls]
 
.
Assuming di↵erentiability of W (·), the first-order conditions are:169
ls : r   µ = 0 (5)
k0 :  1 +  E {Wk0} = 0 (6)
b0 :  (1  d)q +  E {Wb0} = 0 (7)
µ : A+ s(k) + b(1  d)  ls   0 & µ[A+ s(k) + b(1  d)  ls] = 0 (8)
Combining equations (5), (6), and the envelope condition with respect to k, we obtain:
1 = sk(k
0) E {(1 + r0)} , (9)
8
which defines the optimal choice of k0. Combining equation (7) with the envelope condition170
with respect to b we obtain:171
q =
8<:   E{(1  d0)(1 + r0)} if d = 00 if d = 1 (10)
This expression shows that in the case of a default in the next period, (d0 = 1) the lender172
loses not only its original investment in sovereign bonds but also the future gains that those173
bonds would have created had they been repaid. These gains are captured by r0.174
Equation (10) is the condition pinning down the price of debt subject to default risk in175
this model. It is similar to the one typically found in models of sovereign default with risk-176
neutral foreign lenders, where   is replaced by the (inverse of the) world’s risk-free rate, which177
represents the lenders’ opportunity cost of funds.178
The loan supply function (ls) is given by:179
ls =
8<: A+ s(k) + (1  d)b if r   00 if r < 0 (11)
2.3. Loan market characterization180
A central aim of this model is to highlight how a sovereign default generates a credit crunch,181
which translates into an increase in borrowing costs for the corporate sector (firms) and a182
subsequent economic slowdown. This mechanism puts the financial sector in the spotlight and183
Figure 1 shows how the private credit market reacts to a sovereign default. The supply for184
loans was just derived above, the demand for loans comes from the problem of firms (detailed185
in the next section) and responds to standard working capital needs.186
Given that the intraperiod working capital loan is always risk-free (because firms are as-187
sumed to never default on the loans), the bankers will supply inelastically the maximum amount188
that they can. This inelastic supply curve is a↵ected by a default: when the government de-189
faults, bankers’ holdings of government debt become non-performing and thus cannot be used190
in the private credit market. This is graphed as a shift to left of the ls curve in Figure 1. This191
ends up in firms facing higher borrowing costs (r⇤d=1 > r
⇤
d=0) and getting lower private credit in192
equilibrium. The planner (whose problem is defined in section 3.4) takes into account how a193
default will disrupt this market.194
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2.4. Discussion of the main assumptions195
Absence of deposits. The main simplifying assumption in the modeling of bankers is having no196
deposits dynamic. Instead, we assume that they receive a constant flow every period: this allows197
us to fix ideas and focus on the asset side of the bankers’ balance sheet and how it responds198
to a sovereign default. Incorporating deposits can make the e↵ects of a default even larger:199
(i) following the logic of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) (also used in Balloch, 2016), modeling200
deposits we could have bankers as leveraged-constrained agents and so receiving a negative201
wealth shock (like a sovereign default) will force them to decrease their liabilities (deposits),202
which will in turn constrain even further the supply of loanable funds and make the e↵ect of203
a default even stronger; and (ii) anticipating the possibility of a sovereign default and fearing204
that bankers will not be able to fully repay deposits, households may engage in a run on the205
bankers, and thus put more contractionary pressure on the supply of loanable funds.206
Both these e↵ects go in the same direction and so our results can be understood as a lower207
bound for the e↵ects of sovereign defaults on the domestic supply of credit. Hence, we see the208
absence of deposits as a sensible modeling assumption given that: (i) it renders the problem209
more tractable and the dimensionality of the state space smaller, and (ii) it is conservative on210
the quantitative impact of our mechanism.211
Constant A. Even when abstracting from deposits may be convenient for computational pur-212
poses, assuming a constant A may be unnecessarily simplistic from a calibration point of view.213
In section 6.2 we relax this assumption and instead model the endowment A as a function of the214
general state of the economy (i.e. as a function of aggregate productivity). This modification215
allows for procyclical flows to banks (a feature of the data) and makes defaults even tougher216
on the domestic economy: when times are bad (low productivity), a default shrinks the supply217
of domestic credit even more. 9218
No foreign lenders. Another simplifying assumption is that the private sector can only borrow219
from domestic lenders. Allowing the private sector to borrow also from abroad will decrease220
the relevance of the domestic credit market for domestic production and potentially weaken the221
channel highlighted in the model. However, as long as a fraction of the domestic firms need to222
9All the main results are robust to this modification, as shown in section 6.2.
10
borrow from domestic sources (probably because not every firm in the economy is capable of223
tapping international markets), the mechanism proposed in the model will still play a central224
role in our understanding of the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates and the incentives to225
default on sovereign debt. Moreover, this assumption has robust empirical support as the vast226
majority of corporate credit in emerging economies comes from domestic bank lending. 10227
3. (Rest of the) Model economy228
Time is discrete and goes on forever. There are four players in this economy: households,229
firms, bankers (whose problem was already outlined in Section 2), and the government. In230
this framework, the households do not have any inter-temporal choice, so they make only two231
decisions: how much to consume and how much to work. The production in the economy is232
conducted by standard neoclassical firms that face only a working capital constraint: they have233
to pay a fraction of their wage bill up-front which creates a need for external financing.234
The bankers lend to both firms and government, and also have access to a storage technology.235
Finally, the government is a benevolent one (i.e., it maximizes the households’ utility). It faces236
a stream of spending that must be financed and it has three instruments for this purpose:237
labor income taxation, borrowing, and default. We assume the government has no commitment238
technology, and this means that in each period it can default on its debt. This default decision is239
taken at the beginning of the period and it influences all other economic decisions. Accordingly,240
the following subsections examine how the economy works under both default and no-default,241
and ultimately how the sovereign optimally chooses its tax, debt, and default policies.242
3.1. Timing of events243
If the government starts period t in good credit standing (i.e., not excluded from the credit244
market), the timing of events is as follows (where primed variables represent next-period values):245
- Period t starts and the government makes the default decision: d 2 {0, 1}246
1. if default is chosen (d = 1) then:247
10According to IMF (2015) domestic bank lending represented 78% to 84% of all corporate debt in emerging
economies in the period 2003–2014, while foreign bank lending was responsible for only 6% to 8%.
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(a) the government gets excluded and the credit market consists of only the (in-248
traperiod) private loan market: firms borrow to meet the working capital con-249
straint and bankers lend (ls) up to the sum of their endowment and stored funds250
(A+ s(k)).251
(b) firms hire labor, produce and then distribute profits (⇧F ) and repay principal252
plus interest of the loan (ls(1 + r)).253
(c) bankers choose how much to store for next period (k0).254
(d) labor and goods markets clear, and taxation (⌧) and consumption take place.255
(e) at the end of period-t a re-access coin is tossed: with probability   the govern-256
ment will re-access in the next period with a ‘fresh start’ (i.e., with b0 = 0), and257
with probability 1    the government will remain excluded in the next period.258
2. if repayment is chosen (d = 0) then:259
(a) the credit market now consists of two markets: the one for working capital loans260
and the one for government bonds. The bankers serve first the working capital261
market (ls) up to the sum of their endowment, stored funds and the repaid262
government debt (A+ s(k) + b).263
(b) firms hire labor, produce and then distribute profits (⇧F ) and repay principal264
plus interest of the loan (ls(1 + r)).265
(c) bankers decide on sovereign lending (qb0) and storage (k0).266
(d) labor and goods markets clear, and taxation and consumption take place.267
- Period t+1 arrives268
3.2. Decision problems269
Here we describe the decision problems of households and firms, and also state the govern-270
ment budget constraint.271
Households’ problem. The only decisions of the households are the labor supply and consump-272
tion levels. Therefore, the problem faced by the households can be expressed as:273
max
{ct,nt}10
E0
1X
t=0
 tU(ct, nt) (12)
s.t. ct = (1  ⌧t)wtnt + ⇧Ft , (13)
12
where U(c, n) is the period utility function, ct stands for consumption, nt denotes labor274
supply, wt is the wage rate, ⌧t is the labor-income tax rate, and ⇧
F
t represents the firms’ profits.275
Solving the problem we obtain:276
 Un
Uc
= (1  ⌧t)wt, (14)
which is the usual intra-temporal optimality condition equating the marginal rate of substi-277
tution between leisure and consumption to the after-tax wage rate. Therefore, the optimality278
conditions from the households’ problem are equations (13) and (14).279
Firms’ problem. The firms demand labor to produce the consumption good. They face a280
working capital constraint that requires them to pay up-front a certain fraction of the wage281
bill, which they do with intra-period loans from bankers. Hence, the problem is:282
max
{Nt,ldt }
⇧Ft = ztF (Nt)  wtNt + ldt   (1 + rt)ldt (15)
s.t.  wtNt  ldt (16)
where z is aggregate productivity, F (N) is the production function, ldt is the demand for283
working capital loans, rt is the interest rate charged for these loans, and   is the fraction of the284
wage bill that must be paid up-front.285
Equation (16) is the working capital constraint. This equation will always hold with equality286
because firms do not need loans for anything else but paying  wtNt; thus any borrowing over287
and above  wtNt would be sub-optimal. Taking this into account we obtain the following288
first-order condition:289
ztFN(Nt) = (1 +  rt)wt, (17)
which equates the marginal product of labor to the marginal cost of hiring labor once the290
financing cost is factored in. Therefore, the optimality conditions from the firms’ problem are291
represented by equation (17) and equation (16), evaluated with equality.292
Government Budget Constraint. The government has access to labor income taxation and (in293
case it is not excluded from credit markets) debt issuance in order to finance a stream of public294
13
spending and (in case it has not defaulted) debt obligations. Its flow budget constraint is:295
g + (1  dt)Bt = ⌧twtnt + (1  dt)Bt+1qt (18)
where Bt stands for debt (with positive values meaning higher indebtedness), g is an exoge-296
nous level of public spending, and ⌧twtnt is the labor-income tax revenue.297
3.3. Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies298
Definition 1. A Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies is a sequence of alloca-299
tions {ct, xt, nt, Nt, ldt , lst , kt+1, bt+1}1t=0 and prices {rt, wt,⇧Ft }1t=0, such that given sovereign bond300
prices {qt}1t=0, government policies {⌧t, dt, Bt+1}1t=0, shocks {g, zt}1t=0, and initial values k0, b0,301
the following holds:302
1. {ct, nt}1t=0 solve the households’ problem in (12) - (13).303
2. {Nt, ldt }1t=0 solve the firms’ problem in (15) - (16).304
3. {xt, lst , kt+1, bt+1}1t=0 solve the bankers’ problem in (1) - (3).305
4. Markets clear: nt = Nt, bt = Bt, l
d
t = l
s
t ; and306
the aggregate resources constraint holds: ct + xt + kt+1 + g = ztF (nt) + A+ s(kt).307
3.4. Determination of Government Policies308
We focus on Markov-perfect equilibria in which government policies are functions of payo↵-309
relevant state variables: the level of public debt, the level of storage held by bankers and310
aggregate productivity. The benevolent planner wants to maximize the welfare of the house-311
holds. To do so it has three policy tools: taxation, debt, and default. But it is subject to two312
constraints: (1) the allocations that emerge from the government policies should represent a313
competitive equilibrium, and (2) the government budget constraint must hold.314
The government’s optimization problem can be written recursively as:315
V (b, k, z) = max
d2{0,1}
 
(1  d)V nd(b, k, z) + d V d(k, z) (19)
where V nd (V d) is the value of repaying (defaulting). The value of no-default is:316
V nd(b, k, z) = max
{c,x,n,k0,b0}
{U(c, n) +   EV (b0, k0, z0)} (20)
subject to:317
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g + b = ⌧wn+ b0q (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g + k0 = zF (n) + A+ s(k) (resources const.)
x = (A+ s(k) + b)(1 + r)  k0   qb0
q =   E {(1  d0)(1 + r0)}
1 = sk(k
0) E {1 + r0}
r = znFn
A+s(k)+b
  1
 
 Un
Uc
= (1  ⌧)w
w = zFn
(1+ r)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(comp. eq. conditions)
318
The value of default is:319
V d(k, z) = max
{c,x,n,k0}
 
U(c, n) +   E
⇥
 V (0, k0, z0) + (1   )V d(k0, z0)⇤ (21)
subject to:320
g = ⌧wn (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g + k0 = zF (n) + A+ s(k) (resources const.)
x = (A+ s(k))(1 + r)  k0
1 = sk(k
0) E {1 + r0}
r = znFn
A+s(k)
  1
 
 Un
Uc
= (1  ⌧)w
w = zFn
(1+ r)
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
(comp. eq. conditions)
321
3.4.1. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium322
Definition 2. The Markov-perfect Equilibrium for this economy is (i) a borrowing rule b0(b, k, z),323
and a default rule d(b, k, z) with associated value functions {V (b, k, z), V nd(b, k, z), V d(k, z)},324
consumption, labor and storage rules {c(b, k, z), x(b, k, z), n(b, k, z), k0(b, k, z)}, and taxation rule325
⌧(b, k, z), and (ii) an equilibrium pricing function for the sovereign bond q(b0, k, z), such that:326
1. Given the price q(b0, k, z), the borrowing and default rules solve the sovereign’s maximiza-327
tion problem in (19) – (21).328
2. Given the price q(b0, k, z) and the borrowing and default rules, the consumption, labor329
and storage plans {c(b, k, z), x(b, k, z), n(b, k, z), k0(b, k, z)} are consistent with competitive330
equilibrium.331
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3. Given the price q(b0, k, z) and the borrowing and default rules, the taxation rule ⌧(b, k, z)332
satisfies the government budget constraint.333
4. The equilibrium price function satisfies equation (10)334
4. Numerical Solution335
We solve the model using value function iteration with a discrete state space. 11 We solve336
for the equilibrium of the finite-horizon version of our economy, and we increase the number337
of periods of the finite-horizon economy until value functions and bond prices for the first and338
second periods of this economy are su ciently close. We then use the first-period equilibrium339
objects as the infinite-horizon-economy equilibrium objects.340
4.1. Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes341
The period utility function of the households is:342
U(c, n) =
 
c  n!
!
 1  c
1   c (22)
where  c controls the degree of risk aversion and ! governs the wage elasticity of the labor343
supply. These preferences (called GHH after Greenwood et al., 1988) have frequently been344
used in the Small Open Economy - Real Business Cycle literature (e.g. Mendoza, 1991). This345
functional form turns o↵ the wealth e↵ect on labor supply and thus helps in avoiding the346
potentially undesirable e↵ect of having a counter-factual increase of output in default periods.12347
The bankers’ storage technology is:348
s(k) = k↵k . (23)
The production function available to the firms is:349
F (N) = N↵. (24)
11The algorithm computes and iterates on two value functions: V nd and V d. Convergence in the equilibrium
price function q is also assured.
12Using GHH preferences, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor does not depend
on consumption, and thus the labor supply is not a↵ected by wealth e↵ects. For a study of how important GHH
preferences are in generating output drops in the Sudden Stops literature, see Chakraborty (2009).
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The only source of exogenous uncertainty in this economy is zt, total factor productivity350
(TFP). The logarithm of TFP follows an AR(1) process:351
log(zt) = ⇢ log(zt 1) + "t (25)
where "t is an i.i.d. N(0,  
2
").352
4.2. Calibration353
The model is calibrated to an annual frequency using data for Argentina from the period354
1980-2005. Table 1 contains the parameter values.355
The parameters above the line are either set to independently match moments from the356
data or are parameters that take common values in the literature. The labor share in output357
(↵) and the risk aversion parameter for the households ( c) are set to 0.7 and 2 respectively,358
which are standard values in the quantitative macroeconomics literature. The working capital359
requirement parameter ( ) is taken directly from the Argentine data. In the model   is equal360
to the ratio of private credit to wage payments and the data show that for Argentina this ratio361
was 52%. 13 We use TFP estimates from the ARKLEMS team in order to estimate ⇢ and  ".362
The discount factor for the bankers ( ) takes a usual value in RBC models with an annual363
frequency, 0.96. It is important to realize that the exact value of   is crucial not in itself but364
in how it compares with the households discount factor (discussed below). The parameter on365
the bankers’ storage technology (↵k) is set to 0.97 which provides curvature useful to avoid366
indeterminacy in the choice of k0. 14367
There are two more above the line parameters to discuss: the curvature of labor disutility368
(!) and the probability of financial redemption ( ). The value of ! is typically chosen to match369
empirical evidence of the Frisch wage elasticity, 1/(! 1). The estimates for this elasticity vary370
considerably: Greenwood et al. (1988) cite estimates from previous studies ranging from 0.3371
to 2.2, while Gonza´lez and Sala (2015) find estimates ranging from  13.1 to 12.8 for Mercosur372
13We measure this ratio for the period 1993-2007 using data for Private Credit from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics, and data for Total Wage-Earners’ Remuneration from INDEC (Argentina’s Census and
Statistics O ce). The latter time series is not available prior to 1993.
14Accumulating k in this model is akin to hoarding cash (in a similar but nominal model). Hence, ↵k < 1
implies a negative net real rate of return on k, a common occurrence for cash equivalent instruments in emerging
economies.
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countries. Here we take ! = 2.5 as the benchmark scenario, implying a Frisch wage elasticity373
of 0.67, a value in the middle range of the estimates.374
The probability of financial redemption is governed by the parameter  . The evidence375
presented by Gelos et al. (2011) is that emerging economies remain excluded for an average of376
4 years after a default. This finding applies only to external defaults. It can be argued that377
governments have additional mechanisms (regulatory measures, moral suasion, etc.) for placing378
their debt in domestic markets, making domestic exclusion shorter than external exclusion.379
Therefore, the benchmark calibration will be   = 0.5, which, given the annual frequency of the380
calibration, implies a mean exclusion of 2 years.381
The parameters below the line { , A, g} are simultaneously determined in order to match a382
set of meaningful moments of the data. The value of the exogenous spending level (g) is set to383
0.0934 to match the ratio of General Government Expenditures to GDP for Argentina in the384
period 1991-2001 of 11.4% (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, WDI).385
The remaining parameters are set so that the model matches the default frequency and the386
exposure ratio observed in Argentina. According to Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2009), Argentina387
has defaulted on its domestic debt 5 times since its independence in 1816, implying a default388
probability of 2.5%, which is our calibration target. As discussed above, the banking sector of389
virtually every emerging economy is highly exposed to government debt. The average exposure390
ratio (as defined in Section 1.2) in Argentina was 26.5% for the period 1991-2001.391
5. Results392
First, we show the ability of the benchmark calibration of the model to account for salient393
features of business cycle dynamics in Argentina. Secondly, we study the dynamics of output394
around sovereign default episodes. Thirdly, we discuss the behavior of credit around defaults395
and the properties of the endogenous costs of defaults generated by our model. Fourthly, we396
analyze the benefit side of defaults, a reduction in distortionary taxation. Fifthly, we examine397
the dynamics in the sovereign debt market.398
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5.1. Business cycle moments399
Table 2 reports business cycle statistics of interest from both the Argentine data and our400
model simulations. For the latter we report moments from pre-default samples. 15 We simulate401
the model for a su ciently large number of periods, allowing us to extract 1,000 samples of 11402
consecutive years before and 4 consecutive years after a default. 16403
Overall, the benchmark calibration of the model is able to account for several salient facts404
of the Argentine economy, as well as to approximate reasonably well the targeted moments.405
As in the data, in simulations of the model consumption and output are positively and highly406
correlated, and the consumption volatility is higher than the output volatility. 17 The model407
also approximates well the dynamics of employment: it is both procyclical and less volatile than408
output. As found in the data, the model features a negative correlation between employment409
and sovereign spreads. 18 None of these moments were targeted by the calibration process, but410
they are all, nonetheless, reproduced in the model.411
The model generates an output drop at default that is endogenous. Data from the WDI412
indicate that in the 2001-02 Argentine default episode, real GDP per capita fell 13.7 percentage413
points (measured as peak-to-trough using the de-trended series). The benchmark calibration414
delivers a median decrease of 7.2 percentage points. The sovereign default triggers a credit415
crunch in the model and this in turn generates an output collapse. This collapse is due to416
reduced access to the labor input, which is the only variable input in the economy. The inability417
of the economy to resort to a substitute input generates a sharp output decline. It is important418
to keep in mind that the average output drop was not among the targeted moments in the419
calibration strategy, which is why the mechanism presented in the paper is able to account for420
53% of the observed output drop.421
15The exceptions are the default rate (which we compute using all simulation periods) and the credit and
output drop surrounding a default (computed for a window of 11 years before and 4 years after a default).
16 We focus our quantitative analysis on the 2001-02 Argentine default. To do this, we choose a time window
that is restricted to 11 years pre-default and 4 years post-default (i.e., 1991-2006 in the data), in order to
be consistent with previous studies that report statistics for no-default periods and also to be consistent with
Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011), who identify Argentina as falling into domestic default both in 1990 and 2007, in
addition to the previously mentioned 2001-02 episode.
17These facts also characterize many other emerging economies, as documented by Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
Uribe and Yue (2006) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011), among others.
18The data for the correlation between employment and sovereign spreads are from Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), while all the other employment data in Table 2 come from Li (2011).
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The credit drop that drives the endogenous cost of default is the main mechanism of the422
model. The benchmark calibration is able to produce a mean credit drop of 8 percentage423
points, which accounts for 20% of the actual credit drop observed in the 2001-02 Argentine424
default (measured as peak-to-trough using the de-trended series).19425
Given that the model features debt holders who are domestic, the correct debt-to-output426
ratio to look at in the data is Domestic Debt to GDP. To do so we take the ratio of Total Debt427
to Output from Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2010) and extract only its domestic debt part by using428
the share of Domestic Debt to Total Debt from Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011):429
TD
Y|{z}
from Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2010)
⇥ DD
TD|{z}
from Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011)
=
DD
Y|{z}
relevant debt ratio
.
This exercise gives a mean Domestic Debt to GDP ratio of 11.3% for the period 1991-2001.430
As shown in Table 2, the benchmark calibration of the model features a debt-to-output ratio431
of 11.5%, which is in line with its data counterpart.432
The average level of storage chosen by the bankers is also in line with empirical evidence. The433
benchmark calibration features an storage-to-assets ratio of 14.4% while the data counterpart434
is 11.3%. 20435
The level, cyclicality, and volatility of sovereign spreads were also not among the targeted436
moments, and they are closely reproduced by the model. The same is true for the correlation437
between the tax-rate and output: as in the data, the model exhibits a negative correlation.21438
This result has been dubbed “optimal procyclical fiscal policy” for emerging economies, in the439
sense that the fiscal policy (in this case the tax rate) amplifies the cycle. Why is the tax rate440
“procyclical” in our model? Because when output is high, it is cheaper to borrow and postpone441
taxation, whereas when output is low, the reverse is true. Thus, we expect periods of high442
output to be associated with lower tax rates and vice versa. Moreover, when the government443
defaults it is left with only taxation in order to finance spending, which leads to even more444
19Both the real GDP per capita and the Private Credit per capita series are taken from WDI, and their
respective trends are computed using annual data from 1991 to 2006.
20Bank’s assets in the model are loans, storage and debt. The data for the mean storage-to-asset ratio in
Table 2 come from the Financial Structure Dataset (Beck et al., 2010), the WDI and the Argentine Central
Bank, and it corresponds to bank holdings of money (and money-like instruments) as a fraction of total assets.
21The data for ⇢(⌧, y) in Table 2 come from Talvi and Ve´gh (2005).
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fiscal procyclicality. 22445
5.2. Output dynamics around defaults446
One contribution of this paper is to provide a framework able to deliver endogenous output447
declines in default periods. Figure 2 shows the behavior of output around defaults: the model448
does feature a decline in output (and consequently in consumption) in the default period. The449
size of the output drop accounts for 53% of the observed output drop in the data. 23450
The model also produces a v-shape behavior of output around defaults. Argentina’s output451
dynamics before and after the default event mostly lie within the 99% confidence bands of the452
model simulations. As in Mendoza and Yue (2012), the v-shaped recovery of output after a453
default event is driven by two forces: TFP and re-access to credit. TFP is mean-reverting454
and thus very likely to recover after defaults. Also, when the sovereign regains access to credit455
markets, then the output recovery is even faster. 24456
5.3. Endogenous costs of defaults: credit contractions457
Why does a default generate such a sharp output decline? This paper gives a credit crunch458
explanation: given that bankers hold government debt as part of their assets, when a default459
comes a considerable fraction of those assets losses value; thus, the bankers’ lending ability460
decreases and as a consequence credit to the private sector contracts. Given that the productive461
sector is in need of external financing, a credit crunch translates into an output decline.462
Figure 3 presents the behavior of the Private Credit simulated series around defaults. 25 It463
shows that credit to the private sector falls in the default period and continues falling in the464
subsequent periods. The magnitude of the credit drop accounts for 20% of the observed credit465
drop in the data; in other words, credit plays a more important role in the model economy than466
in the data.467
22This result is by no means new in the literature and it is in fact a consequence of more general capital
market imperfections. See Cuadra et al. (2010) and Riascos and Ve´gh (2003).
23Figure 2 is constructed from the model simulations as follows: first, we identify the simulation periods
when defaults happen; secondly, we construct a time series of 11 years before and 4 years after each default and
compute deviations from trend; thirdly, we compute relevant quantiles and construct a series for the median
output deviations from trend around defaults; fourthly, we plot deviations from trend generated by the model
and those observed in the data for the t  3 to t+ 3 time window, with t denoting the default year.
24See the Online Appendix for an analysis of the e↵ects of market re-access on output and credit recovery.
25Figure 3 is constructed in the same way as Figure 2. See footnote 23.
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5.3.1. Two properties of the output cost of defaults468
Here we analyze two properties of the output costs of default: that they are increasing in469
the level of TFP and that they are increasing also in the size of the default (i.e. the level of470
outstanding debt that is repudiated).471
Using the numerical solution of the model we are able to compute the e↵ect of defaults on472
output. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the percent decline of output as a function of TFP.473
26 As the figure shows, the cost increases with the level of TFP. This property (referred to474
in the literature as “asymmetric cost of defaults”) is shared by other papers with endogenous475
cost-of-default structures (e.g. Mendoza and Yue, 2012) and has been shown to be critical to476
match the counter-cyclicality of sovereign spreads: in good times (high TFP) defaulting is too477
costly, investors understand this and assign a low probability to observing a default event, this478
translates into low spreads; on the contrary, during bad times (low TFP) defaulting is less479
costly (and therefore a more attractive policy choice), defaults are more likely and spreads are480
consequently higher. 27481
A second property of the cost of defaults is that they are an increasing function of the level of482
debt. This has a clear intuition: the more debt a government repudiates, the higher the cost of483
repudiation. Our framework is to our knowledge the first quantitative model that endogenously484
delivers this behavior (which is supported by the data, see Arellano et al., 2013). The right485
panel of Figure 4 shows how the output cost of defaults increases with the level of outstanding486
debt.28 This happens because sovereign debt plays a “liquidity” role in our economy: the more487
debt is repaid, the more funds can be lent in the private credit market, and the lower is the488
equilibrium interest rate paid by firms. As explained above, a credit crunch translates into an489
output decline, and the larger is the stock of repudiated debt, the larger the credit crunch. 29490
26The shaded area in the left panel of Figure 4 represents the “default region,” which are the levels of TFP
shock at which the country decides to default when facing the mean debt-to-output level and the mean bank
storage observed in the simulations.
27Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) provide a detail discussion about the asymmetric nature of default costs.
They use an ad hoc cost-of-default function (in an endowment-economy model) and their calibration implies
the same asymmetry that our model delivers endogenously.
28The shaded area in the right panel of Figure 4 represents the “default region,” which (in this case) are
debt-to-output levels for which the country decides to default when facing the mean TFP and the mean bank
storage levels.
29The liquidity role of government debt has been highlighted by Bolton and Jeanne (2011), Brutti (2011) and
Sandleris (2016).
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5.4. Benefit of defaults: reduced taxation491
As argued in the introduction, the optimal default decision comes from balancing costs and492
benefits of defaults. The costs of default were discussed above: output declines due to a credit493
contraction. The benefits on the other hand come from reduced taxation. Figure 5 shows the494
behavior of the labor income tax rate around defaults: we plot the equilibrium tax rate and also495
the “counterfactual” tax rate that would have been necessary to levy if instead of defaulting496
the government had repaid its debt.497
The reduced taxation is precisely the di↵erence between the counterfactual tax rate and the498
equilibrium tax rate: this di↵erence is of roughly 20 percentage points on average. This tax499
decline represents a benefit of defaulting because households dislike increases in distortionary500
taxes. In other words, a default allows the government to a↵ord a tax cut.501
This subsection and the previous one show that the planner finds a strategic default to be the502
optimal crisis resolution mechanism: due to worsening economic conditions, the sovereign finds503
it optimal to default on its obligations (and assume the associated costs) instead of increasing504
the tax revenues required for repayment. 30505
5.5. Sovereign bonds market506
As discussed above, the model performs quite well with respect to the sovereign bond market507
dynamics: it produces defaults in bad times and therefore countercyclical spreads. Figure 6508
shows the equilibrium default region (in the left panel) and the combinations of spreads and509
indebtedness levels from which the sovereign can choose (in the right panel). With respect to510
the left panel, the white area represents the repayment area: it is increasing with the level511
of productivity and decreasing with the level of indebtedness. The right panel presents the512
spreads schedule that the government faces. As expected, the spreads that the government can513
choose from increase with the level of indebtedness and decrease with the level of productivity.514
The model also features a positive correlation between spreads and the debt-to-output ratio,515
as seen in the data. From Figure 6 we can see that default incentives increase with the debt ratio,516
hence bond prices are decreasing with the debt ratio (which results in the positive correlation517
30Adam and Grill (2017) study optimal sovereign defaults in a Ramsey setup with full commitment. They
find that Ramsey optimal policies occasionally involve defaults, even when those defaults imply large costs.
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between spreads and debt ratios). 31518
Next we turn to the behavior of spreads in the run-up to a default. Figure 7 shows that the519
spreads generated by the model mimic the behavior of the Argentine spreads, in that they are520
relatively flat until the year previous to a default, when they spike. The spreads dynamics in521
the run-up to a default, as seen in the data, are well within the 99% confidence bands of the522
model simulations.523
6. Robustness524
In this section we study the robustness of our results to two modifications. First, we show525
that the main results are robust to a calibration featuring a lower exposure ratio. Secondly,526
we study a model with stochastic bankers’ endowment and also show that the main results527
are robust to this extension. The online appendix contains a thorough parameter sensitivity528
analysis and also provides a brief discussion about the quantitative relevance of some of our529
simplifying assumptions.530
6.1. Calibration to a lower exposure ratio531
In a recent paper, Gennaioli et al. (2016) report an average exposure ratio of 9.3% when532
using the entire Bankscope dataset (covering both advanced and developing countries). When533
they focus only on defaulting countries, they find an exposure ratio that is roughly 15%. In this534
subsection we re-calibrate our model to feature a lower exposure ratio close to this magnitude535
and refer to this version as the “low-exposure” economy. 32536
Table 3 shows selected moments of the data, the benchmark economy and the low-exposure537
economy. We can see that the dynamics of the sovereign debt market remain mostly unchanged.538
At a virtually identical default frequency (which was a targeted moment), the low-exposure539
economy has a mean debt-to-output ratio of 6.39% (which represents 55% of the ratio obtained540
in the benchmark economy and 56% of the observed ratio). The lenders understand that,541
31While it is true that higher debt makes the cost of default higher (see Section 5.3.1), it is also true that
higher debt makes the benefit of defaulting higher: the counterfactual tax break that households enjoy during
defaults is larger with larger debt stocks. Hence, what matters for the correlation between spreads and debt is
the net e↵ect on default incentives.
32The parameter values for the low-exposure calibration are the same as the benchmark calibration with the
exception of the households’ discount factor ( , which now is 0.99) and the level of bankers’ endowment (A,
which now takes the value of 0.2095).
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with a higher A (i.e. a higher bankers’ endowment), debt is less important for the functioning542
of private credit markets and therefore the planner has a higher temptation to default on it,543
therefore they reduce sovereign lending. They equilibrium spread is almost identical across the544
two simulated economies, but more volatile for the low-exposure calibration. 33545
As the theory predicts, an economy with a lower exposure ratio has a lower debt-to-output546
ratio, should experience a smaller credit crunch and consequently exhibit milder output drops547
at defaults. Along these lines, we see from Table 3 that the low-exposure calibration can explain548
only 44% of the output decline at defaults (5.95% versus the observed 13.67%).549
The main di↵erence between this low-exposure economy and the benchmark economy is550
quantitative: the lower exposure ratio implies (in line with the theory) that the credit and551
output drops are smaller. However, the main mechanisms are still present qualitatively and in552
some dimensions even quantitatively.553
6.2. Stochastic bankers’ endowment554
A simplifying assumption used so far was to model banker’s endowment as a constant.555
However, there is enough evidence showing that bank funding does move with cycle, and this556
may have interesting implications for our study. In particular, movements in A can change the557
quantitative e↵ect of defaults and alter the default incentives: for example, a high level of A558
makes debt repayment less important for the credit supply (i.e. lower output cost of default)559
and therefore increases the temptation to default.560
To quantify the e↵ect that movements in A may have we extend the benchmark model and561
introduce the following functional form for banker’s endowment, following Mallucci (2015):562
At = a0 + a1zt. (26)
In this subsection we re-calibrate our model and refer to this version as the “stochastic–A”563
economy. 34 The last column in Table 3 has the results for this version of the model. The564
33Other non-targeted business cycle moments (not reported in Table 3), like relative volatilities and correla-
tions with output, are also in line with the data.
34We calibrate parameters {a0, a1} to match the mean (26.5%) and the standard deviation (2%) of the
exposure ratio. The calibrated values are a0 = 0.16, and a1 = 0.045. The stochastic–A version approximates
well these two moments, featuring a mean exposure of 26.9% and a standard deviation of 2.4% (not reported
in Table 3). All other parameters remain unchanged.
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behavior of the sovereign debt market is very similar to the one in the benchmark calibration:565
spreads are large and volatile, and the mean debt level is also in line with the data. Both the566
credit and the output drops are somewhat magnified, and so in that dimension the stochastic-A567
economy is closer to the Argentine evidence explaining 55% of the output decline and 25% of568
the credit crunch. Overall, the quantitative predictions of the model remain robust to this569
extension.570
7. Conclusions571
The prevalence of defaults and banking crises is a defining feature of emerging economies.572
Three facts are noteworthy about these episodes: (i) defaults and banking crises tend to happen573
together, (ii) the banking sector is highly exposed to government debt, and (iii) crisis episodes574
involve decreased output and credit.575
In this paper, we have provided a rationale for these phenomena. Bankers who are exposed576
to government debt su↵er from a sovereign default that reduces the value of their assets (i.e.,577
a banking crisis). This forces the bankers to decrease the credit they supply to the productive578
private sector. This credit crunch translates into reduced and more costly financing for the579
productive sector, which generates an endogenous output decline.580
The benchmark calibration of the model produces a close fit with the Argentine business581
cycle moments. When calibrated to target the observed default frequency and exposure ratio,582
the model generates sovereign spreads that compare well with the data, in terms of both levels583
and volatility. Furthermore, the model features a v-shaped behavior for both credit and output584
around defaults, which is consistent with the data. The mechanism proposed in the paper is585
able to account for 53% of the observed GDP drop and 20% of the observed credit drop around586
default periods.587
This paper quantifies the impact of a sovereign default on the domestic banks’ balance588
sheets, their lending ability and economy-wide activity. Its chief methodological contribution is589
that it presents an endogenous default cost that works through a general-equilibrium e↵ect of590
the government’s default decision on the economy’s working-capital interest rate. Additionally,591
ours is the first quantitative paper to endogenize the output cost of default as a function of592
repudiated debt. This makes our framework a natural starting point for further research on the593
optimality of fractional defaults.594
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Table 1: Benchmark Calibration.
Concept Symbol Value
Curvature of labor disutility ! 2.5
Labor share in output ↵ 0.70
Household risk aversion  c 2
Banker’s discount factor   0.96
Storage technology curvature ↵k 0.97
Probability of financial redemption   0.50
Working capital requirement   0.52
TFP auto-correlation coe cient ⇢ 0.7631
Std. dev. of TFP innovations  " 2.62%
Government Spending g 0.0934
Household’s discount factor   0.80
Banker’s endowment A 0.20
31
Table 2: Simulated Moments and Data.
Moment Data Model
 (c)/ (y) 1.59 1.55
 (n)/ (y) 0.57 0.74
corr(c, y) 0.72 0.99
corr(n, y) 0.52 0.98
corr(⌧, y) -0.69 -0.75
corr(Rs, y) -0.62 -0.51
corr(Rs, n) -0.58 -0.53
corr(Rs, b/y) 0.64 0.59
E(Rs) (in %) 7.44 7.39
 (Rs) (in %) 2.51 2.76
E(b/y) (in %) 11.32 11.54
E(bank storage /assets) (in %) 11.26 14.37
Average output drop (in %) 13.67 7.16
Average credit drop (in %) 40.11 8.00
Default rate (in %) 2.5 2.6
E(g/y) (in %) 11.4 11.5
E(exposure ratio) (in %) 26.5 26.8
Note: The mean and the standard deviation of a variable x are denoted by E(x) and  (x), respectively.
All variables are logged (except those that are ratios) and then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter, with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). We report devia-
tions from the trend. Rs stands for bond spread. The data for sovereign spreads are taken from J.P.
Morgan’s EMBI, which represents the di↵erence in yields between an Argentine bond and a US bond
of similar maturity. The spreads obtained in the simulations are computed as the di↵erence between
the interest rate paid by the government and that paid by the private sector. Results are robust to
using an ad hoc constant risk-free rate.
32
Table 3: Selected Moments: Data, Benchmark Economy and Alternative Economies.
Moment Data Benchmark Low–Exposure Stochastic–A
Economy Economy Economy
E(Rs) (in %) 7.44 7.39 7.31 8.05
 (Rs) (in %) 2.51 2.76 4.24 2.75
E(b/y)(in %) 11.32 11.54 6.39 11.74
Average output drop (in %) 13.67 7.16 5.95 7.59
Average credit drop (in %) 40.11 8.00 5.48 10.10
Default rate (in %) 2.5 2.6 2.5 3.2
Gov’t Spending/ output (in %) 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.5
Mean Exposure Ratio (in %) 26.5 26.8 16.3 26.9
Note: The mean and the standard deviation of a variable x are denoted by E(x) and  (x), respectively.
All variables are logged (except those that are ratios) and then de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter, with a smoothing parameter of 6.25, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). We report devia-
tions from the trend. Rs stands for bond spread. The data for sovereign spreads are taken from J.P.
Morgan’s EMBI, which represents the di↵erence in yields between an Argentine bond and a US bond
of similar maturity. The spreads obtained in the simulations are computed as the di↵erence between
the interest rate paid by the government and that paid by the private sector. Results are robust to
using an ad hoc constant risk-free rate.
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Figure 1: Loan Market in Period t.
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Figure 2: Output around Defaults.
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Figure 3: Private Credit around Defaults.
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Figure 4: Cost of default. The left (right) panel shows the cost of default as a function of TFP (debt-to-output
ratio). The figure is constructed for the mean bank storage and mean debt-to-output (TFP) levels observed in
the simulations. The solid line represents the percent output cost of a default, 1  yd=1/yd=0. The shaded area
is the “default region”: productivity (debt-to-output) levels for which default is optimal given that the banks
storage and the debt-to-output (TFP) are at their mean levels.
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Figure 5: Labor-Income Tax Rate around Defaults. The solid line is for the equilibrium tax rate and the dashed
line is for the counterfactual repayment tax rate.
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Figure 6: Default Region and Spreads-Borrowing Menu. The left panel shows the default region, where the
shaded area represents combinations of debt levels and TFP realizations for which default is optimal. The right
panel corresponds to the combinations of spreads and borrowing that the government can choose from. The
solid line is for the average TFP level, the dashed line is for a TFP realization 1 standard deviation below mean,
and the dashed-dotted line is for a TFP realization 1 standard deviation above the mean. Both panels assume
the bank’s storage is at the mean level observed in the simulations.
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Figure 7: Spreads in the Run-up to a Default.
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Online Appendix for “Sovereign Defaults and Banking Crises”
Ce´sar Sosa-Padilla
University of Notre Dame
This Online Appendix presents the details of a number of analyses and robustness tests1
that are referred to in the main paper. Section A presents a sensitivity analysis to assess2
the robustness of the main quantitative results in the main paper. Section B discusses some3
simplifying assumptions and how relaxing them may affect the main results.4
A. Sensitivity Analysis5
In this section we vary the value of some key parameters in order to get an insight on how6
each of them affect the dynamics. Note that parameter values are changed one at a time (i.e.7
keeping the values of all other parameters unchanged). Table 1 summarizes the findings of this8
exercise. 19
A.1. Tightness of the working capital constraint10
Let us first consider how the model behaves with different values of γ. This parameter11
governs the tightness of the working capital constraint, γ ∈ (0, 1]. A high (low) value of γ12
means that firms need to pay up-front a higher (lower) proportion of their wage bill; this means13
that private credit in the form of working capital loans is more (less) important for production.14
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the model performs as expected: for lower values of γ (cases in15
which private credit is not so important for production), default is not very costly. Consequently,16
the government is tempted to default too often. Creditors, understanding this, reduce lending17
in the government bonds market. Along those lines, we see that for values of γ ≤ .30 the mean18
debt ratio is zero and the observed default rate is also zero. On the other hand, high values19
of γ make defaults very costly. This raises the observed debt ratios and lowers the observed20
Email address: csosapad@nd.edu (Ce´sar Sosa-Padilla)
1While columns 1 to 5 have self-explanatory headings, columns 6 and 7 warrant a minor clarification: they
report output drops and credit drops around defaults (measured as peak-to-through using the de-trended series),
respectively.
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default rates. In these less frequent (i.e., rarer than the benchmark) defaults, the costs in terms21
of output and credit drops are considerable larger than in the benchmark calibration (precisely22
because higher exposure ratios bring higher output and credit drops during defaults). These23
dynamics imply a non-monotonic behavior of the default rate as we increase the value of γ.24
This leads to (for example) having two scenarios with a zero default rate and with zero spreads25
that are very different: on the one hand, low enough values of γ, for which there is no lending26
(default temptation is too high), and on the other hand, sufficiently large values of γ, for which27
there are large debt and exposure ratios (default costs are too large).28
A.2. Financial exclusion after defaults29
Next, lets consider how the model economy reacts to changes in the re-entry probability30
(φ). Panel C of Table 1 has the results for the sensitivity analysis regarding parameter φ.31
When the government can re-access credit markets immediately after a default (φ = 1), the32
overall costs of a default (exclusion from credit markets being among them) are reduced. A33
lower default cost renders repudiation more attractive, so we see that for φ = 1 default is more34
frequent. Consequently, the government has to pay higher spreads. If, on the other hand, we35
lower φ (making re-access to credit markets less frequent), then the exclusion cost of default is36
larger, default is chosen less frequently, and the government can obtain better debt prices (i.e.,37
it can pay lower spreads).38
Figure 1 shows how a credit crunch looks in the model. The benchmark calibration of the39
model features a collapse in the private sector credit (i.e., working capital loans to firms, in the40
model). In the two panels of Figure 1 we can see the workings of a credit crunch: as firms are41
in need of external financing, when loanable funds shrink, output shrinks along with them.42
We can also see the effect of exclusion from financial markets: if the government remains43
excluded, the private credit reduces (and remains low) and the output decline becomes more44
protracted. On the other hand, an immediate re-access to the credit market implies a rapid45
recovery in both credit and output. 246
2 As in Mendoza and Yue (2012), the v-shaped recovery of output after a default event is driven by two
forces: TFP and re-access to credit. TFP is mean-reverting and thus very likely to recover after defaults. Also,
when the sovereign regains access to credit markets, then the output recovery is even faster.
2
A.3. Relative weights in the social welfare function47
The model in the main article makes the (common) assumption that the planner only48
cares about the households utility. However, we can study the dynamics of the model under49
different social welfare functions. In particular, we could study the default incentives and50
the transmission mechanism from defaults to banking crises when the planner cares about a51
weighted average of all residents utilities: households and bankers.52
Formally, the planner’s optimization problem can now be written recursively as:
V(b, k, z) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
(1− d)Vnd + dVd} (1)
where Vnd (Vd) is the value of repaying (defaulting). Given that there are two types of residents53
(households and bankers), the overall objective function of the planner is a convex combination54
of the value functions of the two types of residents. Then:55
V i(b, z) = θV i(b, k, z) + (1− θ)W i(b, k, z),
where i = {nd, d} and θ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight assigned to the households’ happiness in the56
planner’s objective function. The parameter θ gives the model a certain flexibility. Letting θ57
be equal to one we obtain the benchmark calibration studied in the main article. Moving θ to58
zero implies that the planner will only care about bankers.59
Therefore, the value of no-default is:60
Vnd(b, k, z) = max
{c,x,n,k′,b′}
{
θV nd(b, k, z) + (1− θ)W nd(b, k, z)} (2)
subject to:61
V nd(b, k, z) = U(c, n) + βEV nd(b′, k′, z′) (hh’s value function)
W nd(b, k, z) = x+ δEW nd(b′, k′, z′) (banker’s value function)
g + b = τwn+ b′q (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g + k′ = zF (n) + A+ s(k) (resources const.)
62
3
x = (A+ s(k) + b)(1 + r)− k′ − qb′
q = δ E {(1− d′)(1 + r′)}
1 = sk(k
′)δE {1 + r′}
r = znFn
A+s(k)+b
− 1
γ
−Un
Uc
= (1− τ)w
w = zFn
(1+γr)

(comp. eq. conditions)63
The value of default is:
Vd(k, z) = max
{c,x,n,k′}
{
θV d(k, z) + (1− θ)W d(k, z)} (3)
subject to:64
V d(k, z) = U(c, n) + β E
{
φV (0, k′, z′) + (1− φ)V d(k′, z′)} (hh’s value function)
W d(k, z) = x+ δ E
{
φW (0, k′, z′) + (1− φ)W d(k′, z′)} (banker’s value function)
g = τwn (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g + k′ = zF (n) + A+ s(k) (resources const.)
x = (A+ s(k))(1 + r)− k′
1 = sk(k
′)δE {1 + r′}
r = znFn
A+s(k)
− 1
γ
−Un
Uc
= (1− τ)w
w = zFn
(1+γr)

(comp. eq. conditions)
65
Panel D of Table 1 presents the results for using different values in the relative weights of66
the planner’s objective function (i.e., different values for the parameter θ). We can see that67
response of the default rate is non-monotonic. For high values of θ (i.e., high relative weight to68
the households’ utility) the default frequency is lower: the planner values the households utility69
more, these agents have concave utility functions and therefore dislike profoundly swings in70
consumption and leisure, and increases in distortionary taxes, hence it is in the planner’s best71
interest to keep crisis events relatively infrequent. As the parameter θ increases, the planner72
assigns less and less weight to the households utility and so crises are more frequent and spreads73
are higher. The case of θ = 0 where the planner only cares about the welfare of the bankers74
is an extreme one: since the bankers receive the entire hit of the defaults it is now optimal to75
never default.76
4
B. Discussion of additional simplifying assumptions77
The model described in the main article involved a series of simplifying assumptions that78
were made in order to isolate the effect that a sovereign default has on the banking and produc-79
tive sectors of the economy. In this subsection we discuss ways to relax two of these assumptions80
and the implications of doing so. 381
Constant government spending. In order to simplify the optimal fiscal policy planning, we82
have assumed a constant level of government expenditures, g. While this is a useful first83
approximation, relaxing this assumption could improve the model’s quantitative performance.84
A commonly used alternative is to render g valuable by including it in the agents’ preferences.85
In this case, g becomes an extra fiscal policy instrument: the planner understands that a higher86
g implies either higher taxation or higher indebtedness, but also takes into account the agents’87
preferences for g. Then, when the country defaults and consumption declines, the planner will88
find it optimal to decrease g as well in order to satisfy the intra-temporal optimality condition89
relating private and public consumption. Thus, if we were to “endogenize” g in this way, the90
model would be able to account for the observed pro-cyclicality of government spending (see91
Cuadra et al., 2010).92
Another alternative is to follow the tradition of Lucas and Stokey (1983) and have g follow93
an exogenously given stochastic process. Extending in this way the model presented in the94
main article, “good times” and “bad times” will now be indexed by the realizations of both the95
TFP process and the “expenditure” shock. We consider that, while enriching the environment,96
this second alternative does not add any new insights to our understanding of the dynamics of97
sovereign debt, bank lending, and defaults. 498
Total defaults. The model economy in the main article is based on the assumption that sovereigns99
can either repay in full or default in full. This is an assumption shared by most of the papers in100
the quantitative literature on sovereign debt and default. In models a` la Eaton and Gersovitz101
(1981), this assumption is easily justified by making the cost of the default independent of its102
3The main article already has a discussion of other (main) simplifying assumptions.
4The computational challenge of adding an “expenditure” shock, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) (or Aiyagari
et al., 2002), boils down to adding an extra exogenous state variable, which increases the state space but keeps
the algorithm and solution method otherwise unchanged.
5
size: if a country is to suffer the costs of defaulting, it had better obtain all the possible gains103
thereof, which implies a full repudiation. In our environment, the cost of a default (i.e., the104
output decline) is not independent but actually a function of the amount of debt repudiated.105
The very nature of the model renders it a suitable laboratory for studying the extent to which106
sovereigns would like to conduct partial defaults, and also for analyzing the dynamics of such107
defaults.108
Recent work by Arellano et al. (2013) has incorporated the option for sovereigns in models109
of this type to partially default on their debts. One advantage of our framework over Arellano110
et al. (2013)’s is that in our environment incentives to default on fractions of the debt arise111
endogenously rather than by assuming an ad hoc “cost-of-default” function that depends on112
the amount of defaulted debt. Studying the reasons why countries may partially default on113
their debts is nonetheless beyond the scope of this study.114
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Tables and Figures for Online Appendix127
Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis.
Moments (in %)
Default rate E{b/y} E{Rs} Exposure y ↓ Credit ↓
Panel A.
Data 2.5 11.32 7.44 26.5 13.67 40.11
Benchmark calibration 2.6 11.54 7.39 26.8 7.16 8.00
Panel B. Working capital constraint (benchmark: γ = .52)
γ = 0.3 0 0 0 0 n.a. n.a.
γ = 0.45 19.24 2.11 45.30 6.48 3.77 4.08
γ = 0.65 0.31 43.74 3.91 56.89 15.50 24.83
γ = 1 0 50.13 0 61.10 n.a. n.a.
Panel C. Reentry Probability (benchmark: φ = .5)
φ = 0.10 1.22 26.40 5.84 45.56 7.52 8.73
φ = 0.25 2.39 17.17 7.36 35.42 7.27 9.46
φ = 0.75 4.04 12.81 8.93 29.67 9.05 14.09
φ = 1 7.97 15.90 14.80 36.05 11.88 25.71
Panel D. HH weight in social welfare function (benchmark: θ = 1)
θ = 0 0 21.57 0 30.55 n.a. n.a.
θ = 0.25 8.28 17.23 13.06 36.03 8.49 18.42
θ = 0.50 3.75 11.01 7.30 25.66 7.49 9.43
θ = 0.75 3.12 10.24 6.80 24.17 7.03 8.38
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Figure 1: Private Credit, Output, and Financial Exclusion. The left panel corresponds to Private Credit. The
right panel corresponds to Output. Both series are normalized so that T − 3 = 100. The solid line ( ) is for
the model average, the dashed line ( ) is for the case of immediate re-access, and the dotted line ( . . . . ) is
for the no re-access case.
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